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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

MARK L. MAUSERT and VERONIKA LUCIE ZDENKOVA,

Husband and Wife,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

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CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE COMPANY; ACS IMAGE SOLUTIONS; SPL INC - LA; JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA; DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION; STEWART TITLE OF NORTHERN NEVADA; CTX MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC; CHRISTA STEELE, individually; and DOES 1-25 CORPORATIONS, DOES and ROES 1-25 Individuals, [Partnerships,

or anyone claiming any interest to the property described in the action,

Defendants.

Case # 3:10-cv-00052-RCJ-VPC

MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE THIRD AMENDED
COMPLAINT
(proposed Amended Complaint
attached)

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COMES NOW the Plaintiff(s), above-named by and through their attorney,

1 RICK LAWTON, Esquire of the Law Office of Rick Lawton Esquire, Prof. Corp., a 2 Nevada Professional Corporation, and hereby respectfully MOVES THIS COURT for an order allow the filing of the "third amended" complaint [Exhibit 1] to be filed. 3 4 The points and authorities that follows and any arguments before the Court 5 in this matter. DATED: This 11th day of July, 2010. 6 7 8 9 /S/ RICK LAWTON_ RICK LAWTON ESQ. 10 11 Attorney for Plaintiffs 12 13 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 15 16 17 I. 18 19 INTRODUCTION 20 1. Plaintiff initially filed the complaint in the State District Court in and for their 21 22 respective County, State of Nevada. 23 2. Defendants' in each case immediately filed a petition and removed the case 24 to the United States District Court for Nevada. 25 3. Plaintiff then each file a motion to remand to State Court and prior to a ruling 26 on the motion, a "Tag-Along" motion was filed and the cases were each transferred to MDL, as noted above. 27 4. On the 4th of April 2010 Plaintiff filed a renewed motion to remand each case 28 29 to the State Court in and for the State of Nevada, representing that the 30 Plaintiffs did not intend to pursue and Federal Law violation, or ask for any

1 determination of any Federal Question. 1. On April 12, 2010 Judge Teilborg, denying the motion without 2 3 prejudice, indicating: "...Before this Court is the Renewed Motion to Remand to the 4 5 Judicial District Court in and for the State of Nevada County of Origin (Doc. #253) brought by the Plaintiffs in nineteen member 6 7 cases' of this Multidistrict Litigation. Plaintiffs seek to remand these cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction despite the fact 8 that the complaints contain reference to federal law violations 9 such as the Truth in Lending Act. To accomplish this feat, the 10 motion purports to "withdraw" these federal claims and then, 11 alleging that there is an insufficient amount in controversy to 12 13 sustain diversity jurisdiction, moves for remand. This proposed withdrawal is an effort to amend the 14 15 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Remand (Doc. #253) is **DENIED** 16 17 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 5. This motion is in response to the order denying the renewed motion and is 18 19 filed contemporaneously with an identical request filed in the United States 20 District Court in and for the State of Nevada. 21 6. On April 16, 2010, Judge Reed, in the United States District Court for the 22 District of Nevda (3:10-cv-00042-ECR-VPC) indicated: 23 "...Joinder is fraudulent "[i]f the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of 24 25 the state." McCabe v. Gen. Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987). Courts have denied a claim of fraudulent joinder 26 when there is any possibility that a plaintiff may prevail on the cause of action 27 against the in-state defendant. See Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 F. 28 29 Supp. 2d 804, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1998) ("The defendant must demonstrate that there 30 is no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of action in state court 31 against the alleged sham defendant."). Defendants argue, inter alia, that Plaintiffs' allegations with respect to Ticor are 32 too vague. Plaintiffs allege that Ticor took part in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs 33 of their property by participating in the MERS system. Ticor is the named trustee on 34 Plaintiffs' deed of trust. Thus, even if the claims are somewhat vaque, it cannot be 35 said that there is no possibility that Plaintiffs could establish a cause of action against 36

1 Ticor. Merely showing that an action is likely to be dismissed as against the 2 purported "sham" defendant does not demonstrate fraudulent joinder. See Bertrand 3 v. Aventis Pasteur Labs., Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213 (D. Ariz. 2002); see also Plute v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 4 ("All doubts concerning the sufficiency of a cause of action because of inartful, 5 ambiguous or technically defective pleading must be resolved in favor of remand.") 6 7 8 9 7. On March 4, 2010, Judge Hicks, in the United States District Court in and for the State of Nevada (3:09-cv-0747-LRH-RAM), indicated: 10 11 "...The Abeytas' complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) quiet title; (2) violation of Nevada's Fair Debt Collection Practice Act; (2) violation of Nevada's 12 13 Unfair and Deceptive TradePractices Act; and (4) breach of good faith and fair 14 dealing. Doc. #1, Exhibit 1. Based on the faceof the complaint, the Abeytas allege 15 only state law claims insufficient to grant federal question jurisdiction. However, 16 defendants argue that removal is proper because the Abeytas' claims are rooted in federal law thereby establishing federal question jurisdiction. See Grable & Sons 17 18 MetalProd. v. Darue Engineering & MFG., 545 U. S 308, 312 (2005) (federal 19 question jurisdiction willlie over state law claims that implicate significant federal issues). Specifically, defendants arguethat both the Nevada Fair Debt Collection 20 Practices Act claim and the Nevada Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act 21 claim require the interpretation of federal law.² Therefore, defendants contend the 22 23 court may exercise federal question jurisdiction. 24 25 However, contrary to defendants' position, these acts define state claims that are 26 separate from, and have distinct legal precedents different than, their federal 27 counterparts. Although federal regulations are expressly noted in the Nevada statutes, the 28 references to federal acts only provides aframework for determining the types of 29 claims that can be brought under the state statutes. The factthat a violation of 30 federal law may be a predicate for the violation of state law does not 31 automatically elevate the state claim to a claim requiring "resolution of a 32 substantial question offederal law" sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Franchise 33 Tax Bd. of Cal, 463 U.S. at 13. Further, the Nevada courts have interpreted these 34 statutes without implicating federal issues. See e.g., Stateex rel. List v. AAA Auto 35 Leasing & Rental, 93 Nev. 483 (Nev. 1977) (enforcing NRS 598);... 36 37 8. Finally, regarding diversity it is noted in Incopero v. Farmers Ins. Exchange 38 113 F.R.D. 28, 7 Fed.R.Serv.3d 976 (D.Nev., 1986.):

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	had some hand in the acts which allegedly resulted in the plaintiff's loss, according to the complaint. Although the Does in this case are not identified with the specificity which a Code pleading state would require, that is not required to prevent federal subject matter jurisdiction here, as reasonable indication is given of their identity and relationship to the cause of action. Therefore, the presence of the Doe defendants in this action destroys diversity, and removal is not proper. If, at some point, all of the fictitious defendants in the case are dismissed, or if they are named and are also found to be diverse from plaintiff, this case would become removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). At the present juncture, however, the case is not removable"
15	II.
16	LEGAL AUTHORITY
17	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 15, reads, in part as follows:
18	
19	"Rule 15. Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
20	(a) Amendments Before Trial.
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35	 (1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. (2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires. (3) Time to Respond. Unless the court orders otherwise, any required response to an amended pleading must be made within the time remaining to respond to the original pleading or within 14 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever is later"

1 Direction of rule of civil procedure that leave to amend shall be freely given 2 when justice so requires is to be liberally construed. U.S. v. Keystone Sanitation 3 Co., Inc., M.D.Pa.1995, 903 F.Supp. 803. Federal Civil Procedure 4 5 Plaintiff has made it clear in all filing of the intent to seek State Remedies. 6 Initially, Plaintiff noted that only "casual reference" were made. This argument was 7 not persuasive as to one Judge. (Judge Hicks Nevada). Plaintiff understanding that 8 the strong policy reflected in Rule 15(a) to "facilitate a proper disposition on the 9 merits." Conley vs Gibson, 355 U.S. at 48, 78 S.Ct. at 103. The amended complaint 10 focuses on specific acts of each defendants, and specific causes of action. 11 "(T)he Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal courts to heed 12 carefully the command of Rule 15(a), F.R.Civ.P., by freely granting leave to 13 amend when justice so requires." Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 14 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 15 (1962)). "The purpose of pleadings is 'to facilitate a proper disposition on the merits' 16 " Howey, 481 F.2d at 1190 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 17 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The propriety of a motion for leave to amend is generally 18 determined by reference to several factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith; (3) futility 19 of amendment; and (4) prejudice to the opposing party. Howey, 481 F.2d at 1190. 20 The amended complaint comes in light of numerous attempt to dismiss the 21 action in the Federal Setting before the motion remand is heard or ruled upon. The 22 amended complaint is not to delay, but to enhance the claims and identify more 23 particularly the defendants and their involvement in the transaction. There is no bad

1 faith. Plaintiff's initial response when Defendants removed the action was to 2 immediately move for remand, and to withdraw claims raising any federal law 3 violations or federal questions. The amended complaints state sound and claims 4 that should be tried. The amended complaint is does not prejudice the Defendant, 5 but answer may of their claims as to lack of specificity noted in the initial complaint. 6 As noted herein, in referring to the various orders of the Federal Judges in the 7 District of Nevada in granting a remand, the matters should also be heard in State 8 Court. 9 Not only has the proposed amended complaint eliminated causes of actions 10 that were too generalized and confusing, the amended complaint is a "good faith" 11 effort to bring forth the exact harm, and resulting damages that should be tried on 12 the merits. 13 This rule governing amendment of pleadings has been liberally construed in 14 the absence of prejudice. Manhattan Fuel Co., Inc. v. New England Petroleum 15 Corp., S.D.N.Y.1976, 422 F.Supp. 797, adhered to 439 F.Supp. 959, affirmed 578 F.2d 1368. Federal Civil Procedure 16 17 This rule as to amendments is applied liberally when justice so requires. 18 Jacks v. Torrington Co., D.C.S.C.1966, 256 F.Supp. 282. See, also, Bouas v. 19 Sociedad Maritima San Nicholas, S.A., D.C.N.Y.1965, 252 F.Supp. 286, certiorari 20 denied 86 S.Ct. 646, 382 U.S. 1025, 15 L.Ed.2d 59. Federal Civil Procedure 21 This rule permitting amendments to pleadings must be liberally construed to 22 give effect to its intent to prevent defeat of justice through mere mistake as to

1	parties or form of action. Wagner v. New York, O. & W. Ry., M.D.Pa.1956, 146
2	F.Supp. 926. Federal Civil Procedure
3	The mandate of this rule that leave to amend shall be freely given when
4	justice so requires is liberally applied. Walder v. Paramount Publix Corp.,
5	S.D.N.Y.1955, 135 F.Supp. 228. Federal Civil Procedure
6	Provision of this rule allowing amendment of pleading only by leave of cour
7	or written consent after a responsive pleading is served is given a liberal reading
8	and amendments are generally permitted absent some justification for a refusal.
9	Hess v. Gray, N.D.III.1979, 85 F.R.D. 15. Federal Civil Procedure.
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11	III.
12	ARGUMENT
13	In addition to expressing the position that all Federal Law Violations and/or
14	Federal Questions are withdrawn in the pleading, Plaintiff has determined that
15	additional matters have be discovered and thus new claims and parties are
16	presented.
17	The pleading is to:
18	(1) Mandate that No Federal Law or Federal Question is raised or sought'
19	(2) Present the complaint to specifies the specific conduct of each of the
20	defendants either jointly or individually;
21	(3) Streamline the explanation regarding the general conduct relating to
22	"predatory lending scheme.

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